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FIRST PRINCIPLES IN SOCIAL REFORM.

WHEN a man has made himself so much the master of a branch of knowledge as to make his opinion of some weight upon questions arising concerning that branch, he is now-a-days often spoken of as an expert. If he has devoted considerable time to it and has contributed somewhat to the advancement of knowledge in such department, he is dubbed a specialist; and as knowledge has much widened in these latter days, and as a man's powers of acquisition are limited, it has come to be recognized almost as a necessary conclusion that a specialist must be a man with a limited range of knowledge,—good enough in a small field, but anything like breadth of view and sound judgment upon questions remote from his special field are not to be expected from him. In fact to call a man a specialist is often intended to discount his judgment upon matters in other departments of knowledge. On this account some men, who have never done anything to show that they have an adequate knowledge of anything whatever, get a hearing upon important matters, to the exclusion of others who have done something, sometimes very much, in some directions.

To admit the above to be practically true so as to be applied as is so frequently done, is to admit that the departments of knowledge have no necessary relations with each other; so that anything like a philosophy of things becomes at once a recognized impossibility. For if a man's opinion is good only in a small department of knowledge, and he cannot adequately master two or more, how shall we ever know the relationships that constitute philosophy?

The truth is we do recognize relationships, and many men are doing their best to point them out, with the end in view to complete an organon of knowledge, and for the solution of complicated questions in sociology.

Suppose some voluble man should produce a treatise on the constitution of the sun, and a chemist who had never

given any attention to an astronomical problem should criticize and condemn the book on account of the impossible chemical relations stated or implied. Would it be a proper reply to say that the chemist might be at home with his test-tubes in his laboratory, but celestial affairs were not to be restricted by test-tube chemistry? It must be admitted that no theory of solar affairs that is contradicted by terrestrial chemical laws can possibly be true. So the chemist need not have paid any attention to the sun in order to be competent to condemn the book, for in such treatment of the sun chemical laws were involved, and if these factors were either ignored or misrepresented the treatise is worthless. This shows that the man who treats of the constitution of the sun — an astronomical problem — must be something of a chemist, but a man may be a chemist and never concern himself about the sun.

Again, suppose a biologist who is admittedly ignorant of chemical and physical science, makes statements that plainly contradict the laws of energy as determined in these two sciences, and this for the sake of explaining some biological phenomenon. If a physicist points out the blunder, is he to be answered by calling him a specialist who may understand thermo-dynamics but who knows nothing of biology? If thermo-dynamics enters the problem at all, the laws hold and are as rigorous there as anywhere else. The physiologists tell us that every physiological problem is ultimately a problem of chemistry and physics. If this be so, the biologist who treats broadly of his problems must so far be a chemist and physicist; or, what amounts to the same thing, he must submit his scheme to the criticism of those who deal with the underlying factors. But a man may be a physicist and never trouble himself about the biological applications of his science.

Once more, suppose a social philosopher presents us for consideration a scheme for ameliorating the evils present in human affairs, in which scheme he plainly ignores the laws of life as determined by biologists, as if such laws were not determining factors and always present as much as the mental facts to which he confines his attention. Shall not the biologist condemn such work?

Is this process a reversible one? Can the social philosopher criticize the biologist's work unless he be himself a biologist,— or the biologist criticize the physicist's and chemist's work unless he be himself a physicist or chemist? He certainly cannot, and this shows that there is a relationship among these subjects in which the order of dependence is easily seen. In order to understand a sociological problem, a knowledge of psychology is essential; a working knowledge of psychology requires a knowledge of biology,

or of the laws of life; and no adequate knowledge of this can be had by one without a preparation in physics and in chemistry.

This of itself is nothing new, of course, but it receives no practical recognition, either among philosophers in general or among the ones who look to them for a solution of the questions that puzzle society.

There lies before me a book treating of some of the problems of political economy, wealth, labor, economics, and so on. There are the names of nine eminent persons who contributed to this treatise, every one of them supposed to be a competent political economist. There is abundant evidence in this book that, with one exception, none of these could stand an examination in Physics for five minutes, and yet they are dealing with problems that are altogether physical. Political Economy exists because men have material wants, chiefly food, clothing and shelter, each one of these being but the name for a particular kind of energy available for individual use,—food being chemical, and clothing, heat, and shelter, protective energy for the maintenance of life. Political Economy thus treats of the production and distribution of energy in society. To possess wealth is to possess an abundance of available energy. To be without any is to be a pauper. As energy cannot be created it follows that what we have must be garnered from Nature, subject to rigorous laws, physical laws that are never traversed, and the strictest conformity to which is the only way of wisdom. These physical laws are a thousand times better understood to-day than they were less than a generation ago. The fundamental equations are no longer in controversy anywhere except among those who have not taken the pains to know them, and these go right on as if such factor did not condition the whole problem, and if they make mention at all of the physics involved it is chiefly to point out the failures of men of former generations, who for the lack of the accurate knowledge of to-day failed in their attempts at solution!

This is the case with nearly every one of those who are the leaders in Socialism, in Labor Reform, and all of that class of questions, as well as being the fatal error of that much-printed book, "Looking Backward." If the author knew half as much of physical science as he ought to have known, he never would have written it. Existence — at any rate here upon this earth — is determined altogether by physical conditions; and it behooves everybody to ascertain these and conform to them as closely as possible, for it is certain that they can never be made to conform to man's wishes, his hopes, or his fears, and will never be different from what they are to-day.

Lastly, the same fault is to be found among those who

imagine themselves to be philosophers *par excellence,* who deal with mind and all its high attributes as if it had no necessary relations with body, with energy, or with equations of any sort; to whom the mental phenomena in insanity and hypnotism teach no lessons. They have no interest in experimental psychology, know nothing of biology or chemistry or physics, and sneer at those who venture to point out their shortcomings, as persons not competent to judge of the celestial quality of their work.

It will be well if every one will, before he gives his attention to the work of an author, inquire for the evidence that the author has properly qualified himself for his work by mastering the fundamental sciences that enter as factors into all sociological problems. Just as we should want to know that the author of a treatise on Astronomy understood fully the physical and mathematical principles that underlie all astronomy, so we should require of the psychologist and social philosopher that he should have a proper discipline in the laws and phenomena involved in the problems he attempts to solve; and he should be made to see to it that whatever advance he may think he has made should square well with that other knowledge we have which is as certain as geometry. To do this, however, will be to condemn all the books and almost all the teachers on social and political affairs the world over. But there is no help for it. If a man chooses to assume his first principles and deduce all sorts of phenomena from them, he must not choose such as deny logical relations, or that cannot be inductively verified in accordance with mathematical and physical laws. And the only sure way to avoid doing thus is for a man to be well-grounded in these at the outset.

A. E. Dolbear.

ABOUT CERTAIN OF THE DAMNED.

If Calvinism had dealt always in generalities our revolt from it would not be so vigorous. But it did not, and its lessons of personal vituperation and hate are the most singularly painful chapters in ecclesiasticism. Taught in its moral lore, and its moral convictions constituting a large share of my youthful piety, I look back with chagrin at the loss incurred in character, and am ashamed of the injustice indulged in toward those who refused to bow with the Genevan.

The compensations of history are always curious, and some one should write a chapter on those reversals of judgment that in due time transfer the contents of Heaven to Hell, and those of Hell into Heaven. It has been said,

accurately, I believe, that each religious advance of the past has consisted in making devils of the Gods of the preceding era. So Buddha dealt with the Gods of Brahminism; and Zoroastrianism marked its advance by diabolizing the character of the old deities of the Aryans. In other words, men outgrow their Gods morally, and find it out. Unfortunately Christianity did not make a wholly new start, but undertook to harmonize Jesus with Jehovah; and Calvin, like Augustine, had the unhappy duty of creating a new theology without leaving out a God that had long before been passed over to Sheol,—retaining principles that were diametrically opposed to those of the cosmopolitan Christ. The result has been that we have been compelled to a revolt in the camp. We are now readjusting Christianity to character. Heaven is passing at least a portion of its contents over to Hell. I am more interested, however, in the fact that some of those who in popular judgment were damned are now passing over to Paradise.

I have the sympathy of quite the majority of the Orthodox when I say that between the characters and teachings of Calvin and Servetus the choice is now for the latter. John Knox is no longer lording it over the Almighty and storming Jesus for unfaithfulness. Channing rose a long while ago; and to-day Theodore Parker is preaching not only in Unitarian but in Presbyterian and Methodist and all other pulpits. Two-thirds of the metropolitan pulpits preach Parker. I am especially interested in the fact that at last that active hero of our Revolution, the friend of Washington, whose leaflet on the "Crisis" was read by the Commander-in-chief's order at the head of every regiment of our army, is no longer among the damned. It was a brave minister who, twenty-five years ago, dared in his pulpit to say *Thomas Paine.* Yet Paine and Jefferson and Adams believed identical doctrines; but Paine's pen was worse than a sword, and they damned him as "Tom" and taught us to hate him. Welcome Thomas Paine to the love of our children at last! Teach them *not* to say, as Albert Barnes did, that "you may be saved, but it must be wholly by the merits of another," but, "I believe in the equality of man, and religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy, and endeavoring to make our fellow-creatures happy."

Giordano Bruno is out of Hell, and, with Galileo, Kepler and Huss, receives the applause of mankind. His statue stands in Rome, memorial of the dawn of the salvation and exaltation of the damned; while the Pope continues vainly to hurl curses at him, and Cardinal Gibbons echoes the feeble prelate, who goes down as Bruno goes up.

Priestley was once among the damned, and was driven into the wilderness of Pennsylvania to escape persecution; Roger Williams found no home in Massachusetts. I have no warm love for Voltaire, but I cannot see why he deserves more opprobrium for "Henriade" than Shakespeare for his Sonnets,—they are equally nasty. But Voltaire was a genius, and Hugo the only other great literary genius of France. So they are recognized; and I am glad that at last we are through with damning Voltaire and make a school-book of Shakespeare. Colenso was scarcely battened down in Purgatory before he was discovered in Dean Stanley's pulpit at Westminster. Darwin is well out of Sheol and high among the masters of conscience and grace as well as of science. Emerson walked through the brazen doors, double-barred, as easily as the imprisoned Apostles. Huxley is teaching politics in Paradise. Garrison is one of our national idols and ideals, and on the whole the infidel Abolitionists are faring finely.

From Socrates to Parker there has been a happy going up. It is a charming feature of our age that we are learning to sympathize with the old Scotch woman who would not be buried in consecrated ground, but "amang the puir unchristened bairns, that she might be a mither to them on the resurrection-morn." When Jove sentenced one of the twins, Castor and Pollux, to Heaven, and the other to Hell, Castor replied, "O Jove! let me but go down, and take my brother's place half the time, while he goes up and enjoys mine." "It is granted," said Jove. The Presbyterian revision of creeds to-day hinges on the fact that the creed as it stands saves only "elect infants." Dear darlings all, from Adam's babes to ours, they are going up at last. Perhaps by-and-by we shall be able to get on without any Sheol at all.

E. P. Powell.

ANARCHISM.*

Those who accept the conclusions of Anarchism believe that it is a science; or, if you please, a philosophy supported by facts scientifically discovered and collated. It is not a religion based upon assumptions, unwarranted or contradicted by facts. It is not a system of metaphysics consisting of undemonstrable speculations. They freely admit that Sociology is not yet an exact science; that, strictly speaking, there is no Science of Society. But they speak of Anarchism as a science because its methods of

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investigation and accomplishment are scientific. In so far as it represents conclusions they have been reached scientifically. If Anarchists have a theory it is because they believe observed facts are best explained by that theory. If a theory does not well account for observed facts it is abandoned, and a new working hypothesis is sought. They do not pursue the theologic or metaphysical method in formulating their postulates.

Anarchists believe there should be no government: by which they mean no government by physical force; no government to prevent persons from thinking, saying or doing what they should be free to think, say or do; no government for the encouragement of those who invade what should be the rights of others, with the protection of such invaders; no government to authorize a few to monopolize what should be the opportunities of all; no government to compel persons to do what they should be free to refuse to do, what it is not necessary for the good of all that they should do; no government in favor of one class as against another class; no government to enrich the idle by impoverishing the industrious. They believe there should be no government that interferes with wholesome individual liberty and wealth-producing exertion. But they believe in well-ordered society, in which the wise, the just, the good will rule by precepts, principles and examples; in which healthful public opinion will utter and morally enforce everything needful for restraint or encouragement. They believe in government, but not government by physical force for the injury of all, or, to use a common expression which means the same, for unjust purposes. They believe in self-control and mutuality.

An Anarchist is not one who wishes to separate himself from his kind, to live independently, to lapse into the individual isolation of the Stone Age. He is an individualist, but also a socialist, a mutualist. He understands that civilized men *must* co-operate, that co-operation is a social necessity. But he wishes to co-operate voluntarily; to have the privilege of declining to co-operate in one or more or all particulars; of resigning the benefits and obligations of co-operation. He values individual freedom above all other possessions, and protests against any organization of society in which it is not recognized and respected. He does not wish another or a majority of others to decide for him what he shall or shall not do, unless he agrees beforehand to such an arrangement. If he wishes to live apart from others he desires to be allowed to do so. He believes in society composed of individuals each of whom shall be free from invasive restraints or compulsions. It should be understood that Anarchists abhor the idea of using individ-

ual liberty for the purpose of injuring others, and they believe that in society rightly constituted there would be found effective methods of dealing with those who should violate the rights or liberties of others.

It should be understood from this statement of general principles that Anarchists are not bomb-throwers — dynamiters. There are some persons who call themselves Anarchists who believe that circumstances might arise which would justify a resort to destructive warfare, and that good results would follow such a method. But, in my opinion, the clearest thinkers, the most scientific among the Anarchists, understand that what might be achieved by physical force would be subject to reversal by physical force, and would, therefore, have to be conserved by physical force. In my opinion, the most careful thinkers among the Anarchists understand that if some transient "tidal-wave" of popular opinion, formed rapidly and by what we call accident, or some sudden uprising of the people, inflamed by discontent but not educated in economic principles, as in the case of the French Revolution, should enable them by political methods or force of arms to secure control of the government, little or nothing would be gained and much might be lost. So that the life of even so hateful a ruler as the Czar is safe from attack by an Anarchist, because it is not the Czar but Czarism that must die before the people can be free; and no Anarchist would think of destroying the property or life of a monopolist, for it is monopolism that is aimed at, and this can be destroyed only by education. Anarchists do not fight with bombs, but with books; nor with pistols, but with pens. They are not thugs; they are thinkers. Not powder, but persuasion, is their weapon. Not by cannon, but by convictions, do they hope to win.

Let us glance briefly at the economic principles of Anarchism.

Anarchists regard poverty as the misfortune that causes most of the unhappiness and crime with which the human race is afflicted. I do not, of course, mean that poverty which individuals might, under any social system, choose to suffer rather than practise virtue and self-control or labor for the production of wealth. I mean involuntary poverty; that poverty which is now, in spite of the virtue, self-control and industry of the poor, so prevalent. Many persons are skeptical concerning the existence of such poverty. It is commonly believed that no one not intemperate or thriftless need be poor. But it is only necessary to open one's eyes to see that there are millions of human beings in this and all countries who labor unceasingly only to find that their poverty increases. It is unnecessary to

dwell upon a fact so patent. Everywhere children are taken from school or play to labor in factories and mines; else why the futile statutes against child-labor? Everywhere is heard the hum of sewing-machines from which hollow-chested women drop into the Potter's Field; else why all the kind-hearted charitable work among the "worthy poor"?

This social disease of poverty Anarchists believe will disappear when its causes are generally understood. And they believe its causes are much better understood by a few than the causes of small-pox or cholera are understood by any; and that they are removable. They believe that what are popularly supposed to be its causes — ignorance of what is taught in the schools, idleness, drunkenness and crime — are its effects; and that, hence, to attempt to remove it by compulsory education in the common schools, charity-organization societies, model tenement-houses and reformatories, however well-meant such attempts may be and undoubtedly are, is to necessarily fail. The cause of involuntary poverty, Anarchists believe, is the taking away from the laboring people — the producers of wealth — a large part of what they produce. This is accomplished by methods not understood without much observation and reflection but easily perceived by open-minded thinkers.

Anyone can see that there are many persons in every community who do no productive work. Such persons must be supported by what others produce, since there is no other fund from which they may draw. Beggars and tramps are a drain upon the wealth of the industrious. Thieves break through and steal what others earn. Gamblers of all kinds subsist upon what others produce; and so do the inmates of poor-houses and prisons. This is plain to all. Policemen, soldiers, and high-priced government-officials whose services are not worth to the community what they get for them, are certainly not producers, and whether they, in part, serve good purposes or not it remains the same that producers are forcibly taxed for their support. Workers are compelled to give up their wealth to support law-makers and professional destroyers of property and life. All this is evident notwithstanding that part of it, however unfortunate, is inevitable in the present state of social development.

But besides these are other large numbers of persons who receive what they do not produce. Those whose incomes are wholly or partly derived from buying and selling land are regarded by Anarchists, in so far as they are dealers in land, as subsisting upon wealth produced by the labor of others. And to this class of persons belong all those who collect rents — that is, those who receive for the use of

their houses, machinery or other personal effects an excess of price over and above what is required to cover compulsory taxes, insurance and necessary repairs upon such property.

Those, also, whose incomes are wholly or partly derived from interest, or the rent of money, are regarded by Anarchists as appropriating what others produce. And so, too, are those who, in buying and selling or manufacturing for sale, receive as the result of such production and exchange more than what would fairly compensate them in the form of wages for their actual labor in superintending, producing or exchanging.

In plain words, Anarchists regard rent-takers, or landlords, interest-takers, or what Mr. J. K. Ingalls calls *lend*-lords, and profit-takers, or trade-lords, as social parasites. Or, in other words, Anarchists believe, and think they can scientifically prove, that anyone who receives in the process of wealth-distribution more than what represents fair wages for productive labor — that is, more than he actually produces — appropriates something that should belong to others, and thereby helps to bind a load of inevitable poverty upon those who are thus defrauded of the fruits of their industry.

Let us look, for a moment, from the Anarchistic standpoint, at the grounds for this belief.

Land is unproduced. It is not the result of human labor. It is what is sometimes called a natural opportunity. It is the passive factor in the production of wealth. Like air and water it is an absolute necessity of human life. When man appeared, like the open air and water running in the streams or bubbling from the springs, it was free to access by him. Anarchists believe that if, from the beginning of human exertions upon this planet, each man had been content to possess and control only so much land as he could productively use, the supply of land free for use always would have been and now would be practically as unlimited as the supply of air and running water, and that, therefore, it never would have commanded a price and would not now be a thing to buy and sell. They believe that the practice of owning land that one cannot and does not wish to use, excluding others from its use, has given rise to rent, or the price of land; or, to put it in other words, that the monopoly of vacant or unused land is the cause of rent. Rent, therefore, does not represent work performed or wealth produced by the rent-taker. It represents wealth transferred from a producer to a non-producer as the price of a privilege that should be absolutely free to all. It is evident that rent-takers, as such, are idlers. They produce nothing. If, then, they subsist it

must be at the expense of those who labor. And by just so much as they are rich others must necessarily be poor. Rent is a tribute that public opinion permits non-producers to levy upon producers by the simple contrivance of holding large quantities of land out of use.

The same reasoning applies when we turn to the subject of interest. Rent is the product of labor paid to idlers for the use of land. Interest is the product of labor paid to idlers for the use of money. Rent is interest for land; interest is rent for money. Both are the products of monopoly. Money is as necessary to a complicated system of trade as air, water and land are to life. If the supply of money were always equal to the demand for it as an implement of exchange, each person would always have as much of it as would represent labor directly performed or products of labor surrendered by him. The only use that money should have is to indicate that so much labor has been directly performed or so much wealth surrendered by the possessor of it; and its value is in that it will insure to its possessor the return of a corresponding amount of service or wealth upon demand. It is not in the least necessary that it should possess any intrinsic value other than that of the paper on which it is written or printed and the labor of writing or printing it.

If men had been sufficiently intelligent from the start, a perfect system of money would have grown with the growth of society, and each person always would have had precisely as much money as he deserved, because he would not have parted with labor or its products without getting a full representative equivalent in money, unless the transaction were made by the simple process of barter, in which case exchange would be made in kind. All this will be more or less unintelligible to the average conservative person, but it will, I think, become plain to anyone who will thoughtfully read Stephen Pearl Andrews' "Science of Society," especially that portion of the work devoted to the principle therein formulated as "Cost the Limit of Price," the original discovery of which Mr. Andrews ascribes to Josiah Warren, with whose works I am not familiar. To this book, the "Science of Society," I am indebted for clear and satisfactory ideas of the true nature and uses of money.

But contrary to all this men have adopted certain materials for money, the supply of which, relative to the demand, is very limited; and even when paper is used for money a very insufficient quantity is permitted to circulate, being sometimes greater and sometimes less, but always under the control of persons who make their living by handling it, and by whose manipulations producers are

see-sawed out of their earnings. Money is monopolized. It is "cornered." It frequently happens that a man has much valuable property but no money. Such a man is obliged to go to those who control the supply of money and hire what he needs at rates of interest which could not and would not exist if money were not monopolized.

The point is this: Anarchists believe that as rent would not be a natural product of harmoniously organized society, neither would interest. They clearly see that interest-takers, as such, are non-producers, and that, therefore, what they subsist on must in some unjust way have been taken from the industrious persons who produced it.

With regard to profits, Anarchists believe that in a fair exchange of goods for goods there will be gain to both parties to the bargain but "profit" to neither. If I want your cow more than I want my own horse and you want my horse more than you want your own cow we exchange beasts. We each, by the trade, gain something, but neither makes a "profit." Profit is not as easily separable from wages as interest or rent, because what is called wages of superintendence is an uncertain quantity; but it may be, nevertheless, accurately defined as that portion of the manufacturer's or merchant's income over and above what he should receive as compensation for labor actually performed by him. And Anarchists believe that if the land and money monopolies were broken, profits would disappear. This needs further explanation, but the limits of this address do not admit of it. I must leave it for your future reflection or study, if you are not already familiar with the line of thought involved.

Anarchists believe, then, that poverty results from the existence of social parasites — persons who perform no productive labor and who are therefore, necessarily, supported out of what laborers produce. These social parasites are thieves at liberty, criminals in prison, gamblers, whether with cards, dice or stocks; sharpers, whether confidence-men or business-men; paupers, whether abroad or in poor-houses; policemen, when in excess of actual need for the protection of property and life; soldiers, unless actually necessary to repel invasion; collectors of compulsory taxes; politicians and law-makers, unless we are to reject the time-honored belief of many of the wisest and best of men that government by force is, at best, a "necessary *evil*"; rent-takers, interest-takers and profit-takers, except in so far as it can be scientifically proven that rent, interest and profits are the necessary outcome of absolutely free contracts between persons as free as individuals ever can be under any possible arrangement of society.

In my opinion, the most thoughtful Anarchists are agreed that, in any possible arrangement of society, sporadic cases of rent, interest and profits might arise, but the amounts involved would be too insignificant for serious consideration and the transactions would represent no injustice whatever. But as all these social parasites are the products of a social arrangement that legitimates rent, interest and profits, Anarchists believe that involuntary poverty is the necessary outcome of, and is completely accounted for by, the existence of rent, interest and profits. These, therefore, must disappear before the human race can be free, wealthy and happy. With their disappearance secondary causes of poverty will naturally cease.

HUGH O. PENTECOST.

THE TEST:

OR, NATURAL AND DIVINE LOVE.

"I love thee dearly!" said my Love one day;
"I love thee truly, and shall love alway.
Dost thou believe me, lover brave, I pray?"

"Now by what token shall thy love be known?
And by what testing can thy truth be shown?"
I said to her, one arm around her thrown.

"Why, by this token,—what I give to thee;
Myself, my life, all that I have or be:
What more indeed could lover ask of me?"

"One little gift, dear Love, I ask of thee,
And if 'tis granted it will prove you free,
And prove, past doubt, that you in truth love me:
The boon I ask is simply—*Liberty!*"

Then my Love shrieked, as if a dagger-knife
Had pierced her heart and drained it of its life;
And cried, "Ask all, ask everything of me
But that one gift, and I will give it thee."

A moment's silence, and God's love divine
O'erfilled the soul of this fair Love of mine.

Then my Love turned, and with a smile of peace,
Said, "Lover brave, I grant you full release;
For this I know,—did I in truth love thee,
I would not fear to give thee Liberty.
My soul would be with perfect freedom blest;
For Love alone can give the spirit rest.

"As proof past doubt that I indeed love thee,
I bid thee go, no mountain-kid more free—
Rove where you will, *you cannot part from me!*"

S. CARTER.

A CRITICISM OF DR. DOWDEN'S ESTIMATE OF "PROMETHEUS UNBOUND."

In a work like Dr. Dowden's "Life of Shelley" one may well be surprised at finding an inadequate estimate of the poet's masterpiece. In the first place Dr. Dowden declares that we must not look to the "ideas" which underlie the "Prometheus," to find its greatest worth. Thus he at once robs it of its right to be called a great poem. "These ideas," he says, are "abstractions made from a one-sided and imperfect view of facts." Let the critic of "Prometheus" "reduce the poetry to a series of doctrinaire statements and he will have all the glittering fallacies of William Godwin's 'Political Justice.'"

If this be so, certainly Shelley's poem would be resolved into an insubstantial pageant, its "marvelous imagery" and its "imaginative splendor" alone attesting to its value. And what could such a value claim to be without a foundation of correct thought? It could be compared only to a gossamer robe of varied and delicate hues, which, when exhibited as a thing for use and beauty, we must pronounce against at once, ignoring such a deception. Any work that is a mere delight to the senses alone has no right to appropriate the high name of poetry.

Dr. Dowden indicates some of Shelley's "one-sided views of facts." "Humanity," he says, "is no chained Titan of indomitable virtue. It is a weak and trembling thing, which yet, through error and weakness, traversed or overcome, may at last grow strong. To represent evil as external — the tyranny of a malignant God or Fortune, or as an intellectual error — is to falsify the true conception of human progress. Goethe's 'Faust' expresses an order of ideas far juster and more profound. The advance of Faust is from error to truth, . . . it is a moral and spiritual ascension, no mere deliverance from the tyranny of circumstance or fate."

Yet these very words involve a contradiction of statement. Faust, it is stated, advances from error to truth; yet to represent evil as an intellectual error is to falsify the true condition of human progress! It is rare that one finds so complete a nullification of reasoning in a thoughtful writer — at least, in contiguous passages. Faust's error, at the start, was intellectual; he believed it impossible to know truth, and there lay the whole secret of his downfall.

But does Shelley represent humanity as the chained Titan of impregnable virtue? Let us read what he says in his preface to the poem: "Prometheus is, as it were, the type of the highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature, impelled by the purest and truest motives to the best and noblest ends." The *motif* of Shelley's drama appears to

be a very plain and true one. Yet, to reach it, we take a brief survey of evil as it is found in life.

The lesson of "Faust," says Dr. Dowden, is the true one. It is one of the true ones. Faust conquers the evils within. Are there not evils without? Dr. Dowden, to be sure, ignores external evil, and holds up before us the image of weak, sinful man. In one sense, especially when we consider heredity and the vast chain of interwoven cause and consequence, we may perhaps speak of evil as entailed. But in seeking for guides for thought and action, and especially for the purposes of the poet, evil is to be regarded as of two kinds: that which we inflict upon ourselves, and that which through the wrong-doing of others or through the condition of our circumstances is inflicted upon us. Goethe's great work concerned subjective evil. Shelley's work — which we make bold to say is as true in its way as "Faust" in its — concerns objective evil. Goethe detailed the all-destroying power of sin when once it has the human spirit in its grasp. Shelley saw the unprotected, innocent soul blasted by an all-powerful force from without. Has not each of us had that in his experience to testify to the truth of both situations? If, indirectly, this objective source of evil has come from man himself, the inevitable result of misdeeds in the past, none the less is it upon the individual soul in the present like the stinging links of the tyrant's chain bound about his unprotected breast. If Goethe solved the problem of individual sin and redemption, so does Shelley solve his problem of suffering and deliverance.

Prometheus is the chained Titan, but being pure and noble, unselfish and enduring, he is able to battle against the power of darkness, and to conquer. Man's false beliefs have worked towards his ruin to such an extent that they also may be well typified by the tyrant against whom Prometheus is warring. This lesson of the nobler elements of man, as opposed to the false and ignoble, in an unyielding struggle,— how grand it appears when explored to its profoundest depth! The virtues of the good, the infinite longings of the pure and unselfish, these shall create a Power that shall at last transform the world of suffering and despair into one of light and joy. If Goethe portrayed the far-reaching consequences of individual sin, Shelley shows the transforming process of united virtue. Are not the teachings of equal value? Shelley beheld as Titanic the purity, the grandeur, the power that thus resides in humanity. Through the office of these potencies he essayed to show that not only shall mankind be renovated, but in a poetic vision he pictured the very earth itself as purified of its dark places, and its deserts blossoming as the rose. It is the prophecy of an ancient book in very fulfillment.

When, after our acceptance of the abstract truth of this, we ask if the actual experience of an every-day world tends to bear it out, we are led to acknowledge that such is the case. What is gradually changing the condition of the masses of humanity for the better, if not the ministries of love and unselfishness? What leaven is slowly softening the hard conditions of oppression and poverty and unpaid toil, and the agony of unmerited pain? The leaven of human kindness and helpfulness. In the Boston Public Garden there is a group of sculpture commemorating the discovery of ether. The bearer of relief bends over the sufferer, who at last is tasting the nepenthe of oblivion from pain. Yet this bearer, this angel of relief, appears in the form of a lofty-browed physician,—and so is a very human angel. The woes and the deliverance rest alike in the heart of humanity.

Shelley fought many bitter word-battles; but his highest thought acknowledges the spiritual truths that underlie all great systems of religion. It was wonderful that he, who professed to ignore the doctrines of Christianity, should yet, in his greatest poem, embody the central idea of the world's last and most human scheme of religion,—the "Christ," who shares the burdens of the world, and endures that the lost may be restored.

Judged from this standpoint, Shelley's "Prometheus" depends for its high rank among poems not upon its marvelous imagery and its splendor of imagination; far beyond and above these, it rests, as every great poem necessarily must rest, upon its intellectual and moral insight and truth.

A. M. Gannett.

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN SOCIAL REFORM.

We ought to define our position and understand what we mean by the Scientific method. It is Social Reform or improvement that we have in view, and we want to know the Scientific method of effecting it. Why do we seek for the Scientific mode? Why not follow an unscientific method? Because it is presupposed that the scientific is more likely to accomplish the desired practical end. What reason is there for such a presumption? The same reason that causes us to believe we can raise figs better on fig-trees than on thistles; that, knowing the geography of the earth, if we steer by the sun and stars we shall reach our destination; that if we eat corn and wheat we shall live and thrive, but if we consume poisonous herbs we shall perish. Knowing the uniformity of Nature, and ascertaining what causes produce given effects, what

ensues from the composition of causes, and what frustrates results, we are able to predict what lines of action, what conditions, are favorable to the end sought, and what are opposed. We thus see that the practical science of social amelioration is based upon a theoretical science. We must know in order that we may believe and act. The practical Scientific method must, therefore, be developed from that exact knowledge for which Aristotle and Bacon sought and which is the only sure foundation upon which to build.

The factors would seem to be simple, being only men dwelling together. But this association speedily evokes the most intricate and perplexing questions, arising from the circumstance that man is dependent upon his fellows while at the same time his interests may be antagonistic to them. Man tightly bound to man, but yet for deadly conflict, is the spectacle presented. How to transform this struggling mass of human beings in a living death, into an orderly, contented and happy community wherein the desires of all are attained and each can realize his own aims, is the problem of social improvement.

Is the solution possible? Let us study Nature. And by Nature I mean all that has been produced to human experience; that stream of events which has proceeded from chaos and ancient night; which always is, and yet is in ceaseless flux, the perpetual contradiction of being and becoming over which the Ionic and Eleatic philosophers debated, and which the acute and imaginative Egyptians loved to symbolize in the myths of Isis and Osiris. Our field of study is the solar and stellar universe, the globe on which we dwell, the sequences of inorganic growth, and the various forms of organic life, man and his progress from the beginning. Seeing what is and ascertaining what has been, we may perhaps determine what will be. If a complete solution is not possible, an approximate one may, perchance, be reached.

Natural forces are of two general sorts, the mechanical and the chemical. The one operate by antagonisms, the other by assimilations; the one are destructive, the other constructive; the one are characteristic of the inorganic, the other of the organic. As evolution has proceeded, organic life has become more complex, and hence the assimilating forces have been growing more far-reaching, more abundant, and more essential. This is as true of human life as it is of lower forms. In human society there is a multitude of individuals, each of whom is an organic whole, a source of life and power, having its own aspirations, purposes, and ends to fulfill. An ideal of his own greatness and glory shines before him; the world is his for achievement; everything is regarded as an instrument for his purposes; those who will submit and help are

welcome, those who oppose he will dash in pieces. The reader of Walt Whitman's poems will find there described the type of man filled with expansiveness, initiativeness, creativeness, self-development, in whom the spirit of individualism is dominant and aggressive.

But this individualism receives a constant check from the fact that man does not live in isolation. The difference of sex necessitates gregariousness. Mutual interests are developed, and the individual finds that his own cherished objects of attainment involve the co-operation of his fellows, who are constituted precisely like himself. He cannot have their society without making concessions to their personalities. He must do at least some of the things they want in order to get the things he wants. And the more people he has communication with the more varied will be the modes of mutual yielding. The social sentiments, then, which have regard for others, grow alongside of the selfish in the human individual, and become more complex as social intercourse is extended and the interdependence of human beings becomes more fully established. The predatory appetites are weakened, their urgency becomes less, while the social interests are enlarged and the sympathetic feelings increased in power and scope.

Thus the fact that there has been an evolutionary progress toward a mutual accommodation of human actions and aims in a peacefully-ordered community, proves that a solution of the problem we proposed is possible, since it has been already partially solved. We see how its solution has been possible, and how, if at all, its solution will be made more complete. This we are able to understand only through a scientific observation of the facts of human nature as revealed by psychology, anthropology and sociology. We note that each individual will follow out his own aims and desires, and can do nothing else, for he is both a source of power and an end unto himself. He will be guided by the law of his own being, established by his constitution, his training and circumstances. His ideal will always be to do what he wishes to do; then only will he be satisfied. He can be restrained and prevented from following his chosen course, but he will elude, overcome and thwart the controlling force if he possibly can. If the pressure be increased, his energy is crushed out and he has no more power of self-development at all.

The strong hand of government, therefore, is a most imperfect method of securing that mutual comity which is the ideal of a perfect State. It can only be administered by men acting forcibly against other men. This of itself fosters the very spirit of antagonism which it is most important to eradicate. The process is repressive of that individual expansion which is the fountain of all social

progress. While governmental control is necessary to some extent, no doubt, the needs of a higher civilization demand its continual limitation within narrower bounds and its reduction to a minimum. In the nature of things the rule of man over man, whether by a monarch or the demos, is detrimental to the perfection both of the individual and of society. Its value consists in preventing chaos, in holding men together in security so as to allow the working of a much better process.

This better way is the only way of perfecting civilization. It allows the individual to have his own will in the most complete liberty, but it aims so to mould his character that his wishes and desires shall coincide exactly with the demands of social welfare. Said Emerson: "Every man takes care that his neighbor shall not cheat him. But a day comes when he begins to care that he do not cheat his neighbor. Then all goes well. He has changed his market-cart into a chariot of the sun." This is precisely the Scientific method of promoting reform,—its central, essential idea, the only thorough and successful mode, without which nothing else is of any utility and to which everything else should be held subservient.

Theoretical science thus furnishes to practical science two complementary precepts, which should guide all efforts toward social reform. The first is to keep limiting the sphere and diminishing the functions of government, reducing both as fast and as far as is consistent with security. The other is to foster in every practicable way the formation and maintenance of the altruistic character in individuals.

From what I have said it will sufficiently appear that the Scientific method is opposed to the Theological, so far as the latter makes obedience to authority the means of reaching the social millennium. It makes no difference if the authority be divine. Divinity always has human interpreters and vicegerents. Divine authority is but another form of autocracy or aristocracy, more objectionable than the others, because it is less elastic, assuming that being divine it must be unchangeable. It is hence seriously obstructive of that process of evolution, in the preservation of which life subsists, and in the absence of which is decay and death to the social organism. Theology, however, is not religion. Happily, in the course of religious development, particularly in Christianity, the Scientific principle has been reached, has become prominent, and its value demonstrated. The most strenuous efforts have been made in the history of this religion to sustain the principle of authority, but the vitality and power of the Scientific doctrine has been so great as repeatedly and I think at last permanently to triumph, while the blessed effects of its

practical use have given to Christianity all its success and glory.

The Scientific method is also opposed to the Anarchistic, because it recognizes that society is a growth, and knows that if at a given stage existing institutions are radically destroyed it is only by a process of growth that new ones can arise; that this process will be just as complicated as the preceding one, and will have to go through its various stages of imperfection before any perfection can be reached. First the stem, then the flower, then the fruit after its kind. Nothing can exist except as suited to its surrounding conditions. Cataclysms in society are sometimes inevitable, because there seems to be no hope for improvement. All the avenues are closed up. But the virtue of the Scientific method is that it takes care to keep open the avenues for the movement of evolutionary forces, and to render anarchic disturbances unnecessary and even impossible.

The Scientific method has no part or lot with the Socialistic, if by the latter is meant the theory which proposes the State and its government machinery as the chief agency for guiding and training the human race to positive and progressive development, and for doing for individuals, positively, what they could not do for themselves. The reason why this principle is unscientific is apparent from what has gone before. To accomplish socialistic ideals, power must be accumulated. Where? In the hands of men. Whence comes it? It is taken away from other men. Who are to use it? Men. For what purpose? Theoretically, for the common weal. If it is not so used, there is tyranny and greater wretchedness than before. The users of this power then must be supremely intelligent and supremely benevolent. When the amount of government we have is so largely in the hands of thieves, cutthroats and ruffians, what encouragement have we to believe that, if government had more power and more directions for its activity, matters would be improved? The answer to Socialism always is: The accumulation and exercise of power by the State is necessarily the vesting of power in individuals to be used by them over others. If the community is chiefly made up of people who are good and righteous from the social point of view, there is no need of such accumulation. If, on the other hand, the community contains any considerable evil element, increase of State functions tends to abridge the common liberty, to disturb the social equilibrium, to foster oppression, and to inaugurate a retrograde movement toward the primitive forms of "man's inhumanity to man," which made life a lurid drama of woe and wretchedness.

Having now presented what I conceive to be the Scien-

tific method of effecting social reform, I shall not bring forward arguments to support it more than have already been indicated in the course of exposition. I shall occupy the remainder of my time with a few cautions and suggestions regarding its application. The first of these is that the Scientific method does not require a person to become either an idiot to understand or an imbecile to apply it. Because our true principle is to seek for the minimum of government, we are not required to abolish all laws and offices. Though we are to develop the altruistic character in which selfishness is to be put aside and thoughts of the common good to prevail, we must remember that if our neighbors became too thoroughly altruistic they might all commit suicide. Though such an act would not be without its compensations to us, it would leave us rather lonesome, and might be otherwise inconvenient. If we are convinced that our butcher is a wicked man, we would not like to have him become so altruistic as to stop killing sheep and calves, till we had learned where another butcher could be found of the old way of thinking. We want all lawyers to be honest and kind-hearted, but in our own cases we think the thing to be done is to bedevil and beat the other side. Beautiful as absolute altruism may be in theory, if put into practice it would either result in universal hari-kari or in a reversed form of selfish competition. Some of you may have read James De Mille's "Strange Manuscript found in a Copper Cylinder," wherein the remarkable tale is told of a land at the South Pole, whose inhabitants thought poverty and low-estate to be the most desirable objects of life. But the moment these became ends to be sought, a condition of struggle was developed, caused by every man endeavoring to put off his wealth and his comforts upon others. Hence it became necessary to limit and regulate altruism by law, restraining those too eager to give away their possessions for the sake of attaining the pauper condition. If there happened to be any public occasion at which there were places of honor or vantage, a fight was apt to ensue from the circumstance that everybody would insist on his neighbor taking the better place. Death, too, was regarded as the greatest of boons, and self-destruction had to be strongly discountenanced, people being compensated for this prohibition by the promise of a public death as a matter of honor if they succeeded in repressing their self-denying impulses. It thus appears that we must be careful to love our neighbors only as ourselves, not better; else ruinous consequences may ensue and the world be turned topsy-turvy.

The Scientific rule of the application of all general principles is, Survey the whole field and be sure of your facts. All through Nature, frustrating causes are in

constant operation. There is a compounding of forces which everywhere modifies effects. In the social organism this is peculiarly true, and it takes a much more careful and judicial study to calculate effects here, than it does in the mechanical or theological world. Hence we must move cautiously and tentatively in this region. Thus it happens that the truly "practical man" is often more successful than theorists. But, though he may ridicule science, such a one it is who after all is the true scientist. He takes account of the facts. He generalizes and reasons inductively, gathering together the various lines of the operation of forces, while the doctrinaire pursues only one line deductively, falsely assuming that conditions do not change and that reaction does not modify action.

Loyalty to a principle, as to a person, may easily be overdone. It prevents criticism, reformation and readjustment of principles. Enthusiasm is of more value in an unscientific age, when men are too ignorant to be skilful in bringing about results, and when intellectual activities do not have free play. In former times, and now even in many places, the king is really a god, to be thought of with awe and reverence, never to be criticized. In a thoroughly scientific community he is, as a royal personage, tawdry and contemptible. The day was when the orator who appealed fervently to the feelings governed men's minds; to-day such appeals are usually ridiculous. It must be remembered that Mohammed, fired with tremendous zeal, vainly endeavored to solve the social problem by galloping with drawn sword over three continents, cutting down all who opposed; while Buddha solved it by sitting down under a tree and going to sleep.

If I were asked what was the Zeit-geist proper to a scientific age, I should unhesitatingly say, the eternal Mugwump-spirit. It is a great pity to have so much good activity wasted through an undiscriminating devotion to party, in politics, in religion, and even in scientific inquiry. Most people never know when to leave their party and join a better one. They cannot make the higher synthesis; they are bound by the chains of fear and prejudice. Into their obstinate adherence to their idols enters also, unconsciously to themselves, a very dangerous form of egotism. Nothing is good except what they favor and what they are personally concerned in bringing about. Many a reform has been prevented because some leader has sulked and withdrawn his support when he could not become preeminent in achieving its success. Such men esteem themselves to be the center of the universe, but they forget that the more they indulge this thought the more the universe contracts to their vision, until at last it may chance that they can see no farther than their hands can reach, and are

as ignorant of what is really going on in the world beyond as a man of normal mind would be of what is transpiring in the planet Saturn.

Thus the only safety lies in constant criticism of opinions, laws, principles, courses of action, one's own not less than other people's. Beware of partisanship, be suspicious of growing loyalty to abstract principles or fanatical support of any party; avoid animosities, and look out for the pugilistic or polemical spirit when people differ from you; above all, keep your intelligence clear by purging your soul of the lust of domination; then you are in good condition to apply the Scientific method to all the problems of social life.

DANIEL GREENLEAF THOMPSON.

ZETETIA.

WHAT doth the God with this white dreamy day
So far off in the great eternity?
What Purpose worketh upward through the sky,
From growing grass and silent soil and play
Of incommunicative winds that stray
On moaning missions round the world? And why
Doth Life, with tongue that seemeth alien, cry
Through Nature unto voiceless voids for aye?

O silent Moulder of unquiet hearts!
Teach us how better than clear-seeing eyes
Are yearnings through the shrouded mysteries
Where Hope the glamour casts of prismy arts;
And Nature's grace, how better wooed and won
Than lawless power Desire would feed upon!

C. A. LANE.

THE BRAHMIN CASTE OF NEW ENGLAND.

DR. O. W. HOLMES has somewhere described a class of men to whom he applies the above title. He means by that phrase persons who, sprung from a refined and intelligent ancestry, have inherited and cultivated intelligence and refinement. The characterization is just, as well as expressive; but there is now existing and flourishing among us a class of persons to whom the phrase, "The Brahmin Caste of New England," much more appropriately belongs.

The cultured, refined, literary class which Dr. Holmes had in mind do not claim to be, and are not in fact, better men than the majority of their fellow-citizens. They have even special faults of their own; and a considerably

portion of the superiority generally conceded to them is a superiority of surface, like veneering, which may perhaps conceal serious defects. Moreover, they are not an organized body. They are, and prefer to be, individuals. They rarely act in concert, and take no measures of proselytism to increase their number. They very rarely speak or act as a class, and they make no pretensions as a class.

The New England men whom I have in mind as bearing a much stronger resemblance than these to the Brahmin caste of India are an organized body, constituting a Society for active practical work. The central idea of its founders was that, since they were better and wiser than the mass of the community around them, this superiority in wisdom and goodness imposed upon them certain obligations. Recognizing the duty of the strong to help the weak, of the wise to enlighten the ignorant, and of the good to do their part towards reformation of the evil, they assumed that their voluntary undertaking of measures so useful and important entitled them to claim and exercise the authority of teachers over pupils. They determined to establish a paternal government; to rule, for the purpose of doing good. Their view was wide-reaching in its comprehensiveness. Their field was the world. So they made a beginning with the community around them, inviting all men to partake of their beneficence, on condition of submitting to their authority.

There are differences, as well as resemblances, between the Brahmins of New England and those of India. The latter claim to be more holy than the lower castes in their country, but keep their holiness as a monopoly for selfish purposes, and feel no desire to diffuse and extend it; while the claim of the New England Brahmins to superior goodness is made for the very purpose of reforming and elevating those below them. The Brahmins of both countries insist on the maintenance and perpetuity of Caste; but while the old institution takes this ground solely for self-exaltation, the new one claims to take it as the indispensable means of accomplishing its works of beneficence to others.

The New England Brahmins whom I am describing resemble the Indian ones in holding a Trinitarian theology. Their Trinity, however, is a different one. They make no mention of Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the Preserver, or Siva the destroyer, except to denounce them as false gods, and the worship of them as idolatry. Nevertheless, they vehemently enjoin the worship of a Creator, of a Preserver (whom they prefer to call Savior or Redeemer), and also of a Destroyer. The ultimate destruction of a large part of the human family is one of their most cherished tenets.

The Indian Brahmins claim superiority on the ground

that they are holy. The New England Brahmins make the same claim on the ground that they are pious. But to this point of resemblance between the two succeeds a material point of difference. The Indian Brahmins wish to monopolize holiness for themselves, and have no desire to diffuse it, or to allow its benefits to be shared by the inferior castes. The New England Brahmins, on the contrary, associate themselves expressly for the purpose of extending to the inferior caste (whom they denominate impenitent sinners) the advantages of that piety which they claim to possess and to find precious. While therefore the Indian Brahmin makes his holiness a ground for selfish isolation, and even for contempt of his inferiors, the New England Brahmin is moved by his piety to mingle with the impenitent sinners around him, and to seek intimacy with them that he may benefit them.

These New England Brahmins call themselves "The Young Men's Christian Association." They have a genuine desire to benefit those whom they take the liberty to call "impenitent sinners," and they claim that their beneficence is gratuitously offered. "Without money and without price" is an expression which they are accustomed to use as descriptive of the terms they offer. But this claim is not well-founded. Their favors are not given, but sold; and the consideration demanded for them is distinct acknowledgement, practical as well as theoretical, of the superiority of the Brahmin caste. They urgently invite the impenitent sinners in their vicinity to join their Association and share its benefits (some of them actual benefits), on the express condition, however, that the superiority of the Brahmin caste be recognized, acknowledged and submitted to. They are, and have determined to continue to be, the governing class, the "upper crust," and each impenitent sinner who joins them must consent to be ruled at the pleasure of this class. The Indian Brahmin wears the sacred cord as the proof of his holiness. The New England Brahmin must have his certificate of Orthodox church-membership as the proof of his piety. And the Association assumes that piety, *thus certified* (since Unitarian or Universalist church-membership will not avail), entitles its possessor to various rights and privileges beyond those of common men. I quote the proof of this statement from the printed Constitution of the Y. M. C. A. in my native town, as follows: —

"Article II. Members.

"Sec. 1. Any man who is a member in regular standing of an Evangelical Church may become an Active member of this Association by the payment of one dollar annually. Active members only shall have the right to vote and be eligible to office.

"Sec. 2. Any man of good moral character may become an

Associate member of this Association by the payment of one dollar annually."

"ARTICLE VIII. Amendments.

"Sec. 1. The provisions of this Constitution as to the eligibility for office shall never be annulled, and no amendment to this Constitution shall be made which would allow the said provisions to be annulled. In other respects this Constitution may be altered or amended by a vote of three-fourths of the Active members present at any regular meeting."

Could any device of the Indian Brahmin show him more resolute to maintain and perpetuate the "caste" idea? Not only must the Brahmins of the Y. M. C. A. monopolize the ruling power, but this feature of the institution must never be changed!

Another peculiar feature of the Y. M. C. A. appears in ARTICLE IX., as follows:—

"Sec. 1. There shall be no discussion of the different doctrines held by Evangelical Churches in any of the meetings of this Association."

The "Associate" or low-caste members of the Association are allowed to speak in the meetings, though not to vote or hold office. We have seen above that no discussion of the different doctrines held by Evangelical Churches is allowed. It is supposable, however, that some low-caste member may hold it desirable to speak in commendation of some doctrine or practice of a church not classed as "Evangelical." It seems to have been for a case like this that Sec. 1 of ARTICLE VII., on Discipline, was enacted, as follows:—

"In case of misconduct of any member of this Association, the Board of Managers shall take such steps as are necessary to preserve the honor and integrity of this Association."

The meaning, intent, and practical efficacy of this vaguely worded article of discipline may be judged by a transaction which took place years ago in the Boston Y. M. C. A., when the writer was personally cognizant of and intimately acquainted with its affairs.

A Unitarian had joined the Association (of course as an "Associate" or inferior member), and had used the freedom given by the Constitution to call the attention of his fellow-members to some particulars of the Unitarian faith. Immediately after the next meeting of the Board of Managers, this gentlemen was notified by them that he was no longer a member of the Association, thus depriving him, for the remainder of the year, of various rights and privileges which he had bought and paid for. Not choosing, however, to submit to robbery without protest, the gentleman in question went, as he had been accustomed to do, to the Reading-room of the Association. The result was that he was thrust out of the room by the manual force of the

General Secretary and one of his high-caste assistants, and was assured that that process would be repeated in case of his return. Probably they really thought that "the honor and integrity of the Association" were thus appropriately vindicated.

Returning to the methods of the Y. M. C. A. in my native town in Massachusetts the present year, the following features of them struck me as peculiar.

Going to the rooms of the Association, I asked the keeper of them to show me the Constitution, or the Rules and Regulations of the Y. M. C. A. To my amazement, he replied that he had no copy of them, and that he had never seen a copy. But, he added, handing me a little document labelled "Pocket Manual," published by the Society, and pointing to a paragraph in it, "If you wish to join the Association, you need only sign this application." The page in question read as follows: —

"*Application for Membership*
In the Newburyport Young Men's Christian Association.

"Signing this application is held equivalent to signing the Constitution.

"The first year's membership-fee, $1.00, should accompany this application.

"Name,
"Residence, No. ..... Street.
"Member of what Church?
"Attend what Church?
"Place of Business,
"Position in Business,
"Time in City, Age,
"Recommended by
"Newburyport, Mass., ... 18 ."

Surprised at the mental and moral characteristics implied in both parties to the transaction thus outlined, I asked further,—"Are your applicants accustomed thus to promise obedience to the rules without knowing what they are?" He said that that was the ordinary method of application. "And does the Association continue, year after year, to receive members on the strength of such a promise?" Again the answer was affirmative. What is to be thought of the morality of an Association which thus invites its candidates to promise obedience to rules entirely unknown to them? And how dense must be the ignorance, and how gross the carelessness, of young men who promise blindfold obedience to rules which are not shown them!

When the ignorant and careless young man has accepted the Brahmin's invitation, has walked into the parlor which has been baited with various attractions for him, has promised to obey the unknown rules, and has accepted the inferior position there allotted to him, all the influences of the place tend to hasten his mental and moral subjugation.

The condescending kindness with which he is received, the quiet assurance with which he is catechised, lectured and admonished by the Brahmins around him, and the confident way in which Brahminical customs are urged upon him as imperative duties, tend to produce, and gradually succeed in producing upon him the impression that the claims insisted on by such pious people are just; that they are really better than he; that, being better, they have a right of control over him; and that he appropriately belongs in the station of inferiority which they have allotted to him. He is taught that it is sinful not to believe the things which the Brahmins say must be believed; that it is sinful to doubt the doctrines which they affirm as fundamental truths; and that it is dangerous to the soul to examine the grounds of the doctrines thus claimed as fundamental, or to consider them as open questions. All the instruction there given him, and all the influences there operating, tend towards an arrest of mental development in the department of religion, and also in very much that concerns morality.

It is true, however, that the opportunity of promotion is offered to all the inferior caste. Whoever of them shall be certified by "Evangelical" church-membership to have obtained piety may become a Brahmin; but, until those two steps are taken, he must acquiesce in being governed by the will of others, condescended to as an inferior by any patronizing Brahmin, and lectured as an impenitent sinner by any proselyting Brahmin.

History tells us that, among the Plymouth Pilgrims, only church-members were allowed to vote in civil affairs, or to be chosen town-officers. Piety, certified by Evangelical church-membership, was the indispensable qualification for the exercise of civil rights. The State of Massachusetts and the United States of America long ago gave up this ground as untenable; but the Y. M. C. A., from the beginning, formed their Association upon that obsolete idea, and decided to claim and hold the position of a Brahmin caste, disregarding at once the scriptural injunction of meekness and humility, and the Republican doctrine of the equality of human rights.

Freedom of thought has now made such progress that to many it will seem strange that free American citizens, even young ones, should acquiesce in a system which assumes their inferiority, and treats them as a subordinate class. But, though our community exceeds most others in the general diffusion of intelligence, there remains among us a vast mass of ignorance and credulity, liable to be led astray by any who confidently assume superior knowledge, power or merit of any sort. It is this ignorance and credulity which make so many invalids believe the quack's confident assertion that his pill or powder will certainly cure them;

and which make so many young men believe the New England Brahmin's confident assertion that his piety gives him rights over and above their rights, and that it is not only their interest but their duty to accept his rulership and submit to his dictation.

CHARLES K. WHIPPLE.

"VOLUNTARY CO-OPERATION."

ALTHOUGH the "Nationalistic method" is to extend the functions of government to the inclusion of all industries, it is claimed by its advocates that the relation of individuals to this government will be purely voluntary, and that the government will never be felt. If it is true that this "government theory" can ever be realized without force,— be purely voluntary, and one in which the government will never be felt,—it must also be true that its individual units will have attained to such a degree of perfection as to render goverment by physical force unnecessary. In this case, by falling into disuse, such government will cease to exist. Consequently, such a voluntary co-operation as this of perfect individuals, whose freedom were limited only by a like freedom for all, would be a fulfillment of the highest dream of Individualism.

An application, however, of this "government theory" *with* force — and only with force under our present semi-civilized state of society could it be applied — would produce all the evils which are inevitable under Militant Socialism, and would hasten what is termed "The Coming Slavery."

Nationalism, then, means co-operation — but one of two kinds: if voluntary it means co-operation under Individualism; if compulsory it means Militant Socialism.

Yet in seeking the ideal of the former, Nationalism adopts the method of the latter. This method is based upon the idea that the great economy in production under Nationalism — giving men so much leisure — will so far hasten development that force will soon become unnecessary. But are we sure that development is best attained in that way? Is there not truth in the saying that "men will always be as lazy as they dare to be"? The same law that made the Orient, with its luxuriant means of subsistence, produce a race inferior to that produced by the more rigid conditions of Europe — though the races are of common origin — seems ever active. Men need a vigorous and healthful exercise of all their faculties in order to attain complete manhood.

In pointing out the evils of our present social condition,

and in showing the advantages of co-operation, Nationalism is doing good work. But when in seeking "voluntary co-operation" its advocates put their trust in political agencies and recommend governmental interference, do they not then evince more sentiment than real knowledge of "first principles"? for it must be remembered that government of man by man implies coercion, that coercion begets hatred, and that hatred begets crime.

Individualism, like Nationalism, recognizes the importance of environment in developing man; and it also seeks to improve this environment. In considering the method by which to accomplish this, we are brought to the principal difference — nay, the only difference — between Nationalism and Individualism.

The method of Individualism is, 1.) to hold high its ideal,—"the perfect freedom for the perfect man,"—knowing that each is thus doing his part toward moulding that power which is mightier than the sword, and before which thrones will crumble to dust — the power of public opinion. And again, 2.) Individualists are ever mindful that the trend of progress should be toward, and not away from their goal. They insist that men, when shown the advantage of co-operation, will voluntarily seek such advantage.

Are there any who think that co-operation, or mutual dependence, is a new phase in Individualism — perchance forced upon it by the Nationalistic movement? or who think that the principle of "the brotherhood of man" is wanting in its philosophy? If there are, and if we may consider Herbert Spencer competent to speak for Individualism, we may note what he said upon the subject as far back as 1850: "How truly, indeed, human progress is toward greater mutual dependence, as well as toward greater individuation — how truly the welfare of each is daily more involved in the welfare of all — and how truly, therefore, it is the interest of each to respect the interest of all, may with advantage be illustrated at length; for it is a fact of which many seem wofully ignorant." And again: "No one can be perfectly free till all are free; no one can be perfectly moral till all are moral; no one can be perfectly happy till all are happy." Certainly no clearer statement of Individualism need be given; yet its opponents persist in representing it as an unsympathetic condition — one in which the interest of each is a perpetual conflict with the interests of all. They forget that they are portraying a condition (which now exists) in which the action of the individual is hampered by a vast net-work of hindrances by this very government whose powers they seek to augment. The competition they denounce is one in which labor — rendered helpless by being denied natural opportunities — is hopelessly competing against capital

which, combined with government, is enthroned upon the monopoly of the vacant land, the money, and the commerce. When, conversely, we portray the individual with his fetters broken,—with free land, free money, and free trade,—we find that his interest and the interest of all are inseparable. For, manifestly, each, as a producer, is benefited by the greater consuming ability of all; and each, as a consumer, is benefited by the greater producing ability of all.

It may, however, be urged that though we have outgrown the militant regime of the past, we are not fully fitted to the industrial regime of the future, and there must yet needs be some coercion. Granting this, still he who thoroughly believes in coercion needs it most; while he who needs it least can scarcely see its need. Could absolute honesty of opinion be established, the amount of coercion and the need of it would balance. The harmony thus gained must ultimately produce the highest ideal of Nationalism, and at the same time the highest ideal of Individualism.

WALTER F. WELLS.

THE SECRET.

"THY secret, Mother Nature, we would know!
What means the mystery called human life?
Has it a purpose, plan or method? Show
Thy children, agonized with bitter strife,
Hungry for truth, wearied with babblings vain
Of empty creeds, thy pitying face, and tell
What is that inner life, that hidden vein
Of which our life apparent is the shell!"

"Nay, seekers," answers Mother Nature,—"Nay!
No soul hath dwelt in mortal body yet,
But pleaded with me in this self-same way,
Since life began. Would ye the secret get?
This the sole answer: You and I are one:
Our throbbing hearts the same. No mystery
Divides us, and of secret there is none;
One law, one life, one fate, one history."

MILTON REED.

IS A PERSONAL EQUATION POSSIBLE?

THE opponents of the advanced social theories of to-day have many doubts as to the practicability of the proposed Nationalistic movement, but chief among their objections is a decidedly negative answer to the question that heads this article. They contend that, moral, mental and physical inequality being natural, a social equation is logically

impossible. Selfishness, too, has been a factor in working out the problem to its present stage of development, and, selfishness being natural also, the two given natural causes will combine to repeat the result indefinitely — and that result is inequality.

There are physiological and psychological reasons why personal Likeness is unattainable. It is true, also, if there is anything in heredity, that centuries of education and association have stamped the characters of to-day with a pronounced Selfness; or, if Buddhism is correct, countless reincarnations have made an equally indelible impression of the same unlovely trait on the characters of men. How then, it is asked, can equality ever be possible when inequality and individualism are natural?

This is all true except the conclusion that the equality sought by Nationalists is impossible; and that is not true for the reason that the advocates of the new doctrine do not seek Likeness. The equality desired is an abstract principle founded on the common origin, the common humanity and the common destiny of the race. Liberty, Fraternity, Equality before the Law, and Equal Rights are all impracticable except in the abstract, but it is on those abstractions that the Constitution of the United States is professedly built.

While unlikeness remains, individualism must always continue to be a fundamental law of the system. But there are a true and a false individualism, and it is the latter which demands an unworthy incentive to effort. With very few exceptions the prizes held out to excite ambition under the present order of society have been of the so-called "substantial" kind, either good and lawful money of the nation or its equivalent. He who accumulates is the successful man, for through his wealth he can not only receive exemption from toil, but he can purchase political preferment, social position, and even, in a measure, immunity from the legal penalties that should be consequent upon outraged law. This is a false individualism.

True individualism must also strive, but not for gold. It is one of the beautiful facts in history that the world remembers only her great men — honors those who were great in good and noble deeds; condemns those who were great in evil — and in general has allowed the names of those whose only distinction was wealth to die with those who bore them.

Nationalism would remove the unworthy cause of strife, and hold up, for those who contend, only the worthy one. Under Nationalism, an equal income, an equal incentive and an equal opportunity would be as certain as mathematics could make them. This equality would remove the

artificial barriers now in the way of individual progress, and the definition that is too bitterly true to-day, "A genius is one who can make anything but a living," would be forgotten. With the unworthy incentives to effort removed, and with natural unlikeness remaining, true individualism would be stimulated.

There is another phase of this problem of equality that has been a fruitful source of misunderstanding, and that is the fear that social equality would compel all sorts and conditions of men to meet and associate in one vast, unsympathetic, conglomerate social circle. This cannot be true. Like will always seek like, under all circumstances and conditions, and no social code or statute law can make boon companions of uncongenial natures. Nationalists have not taught this doctrine, but it has been derived from the very literal definition of the word "equality" that opponents of the movement have been pleased to adopt.

There always will be select social circles, and, under all systems, there must be of necessity an intellectual aristocracy. There will be classes and class prejudice; there will be jealousies and heart-burnings; sexual lust and its evil consequences; and there will be envy of those who climb to high places in the State and are crowned with honors. But the temptations to offend against the moral good of society will all come from within; they will not, as at present, be reinforced a hundred fold by temptations from without.

In this age of utilitarianism; in this democratic country; in this century of almost insane business desperation; with monopolies serenely triumphant, and nothing but necessarily imperfect tariff-laws to keep a partial balance between supply and demand; with political corruption that is not even denied by professional politicians; with saloons that make drunkards and fanatics — both evils; with a problem of capital and labor that can only be solved by national co-operation,— it would appear that the Equality attainable, even if it is only an abstract principle like the Liberty every American enjoys, is so unspeakably grander and better than our present social system that there ought to be no question as to the result of the current agitation. It may be centuries before the human race reaches the ultimate good, but present improvement, with a view to the ultimate good, is a debt that the century owes to the founders of this government; a debt that must be paid to the future.

Edgar T. Wheelock.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON:

"THE APOSTLE OF THE ETERNAL REASON."

THE deaths of Carlyle and Emerson, occurring so near together, were the occasion for a flood of volumes bearing on their writings. In nearly all of these there was rather more of the critics than of their subjects, and the judgments were sadly conflicting. But there is a continuously growing conviction that Emerson was the truest teacher of his time,—ample justification, I submit, for the attempt over and over to shadow forth some of those truths for which he stands in literature and life.

Emerson's essays are moral inspirations. More sure even than his intellectual sanity was the unerring poise of his moral sense. His morality was the logical morality of Puritanism, stern and inevitable, for he, as much as Theodore Parker and Channing, was a product of Puritanism; a recoil, to be sure, but still a consequence. Rare indeed has been the influence of that hardy stock in determining the mould and form of the thought of the New World, and Emerson inherited what was best in its moral qualities. But with its hard formalism the high spirituality of his nature wrestled. Forms, to be acceptable to him, must be approved by the understanding, and not the most honored observance was sacred if the spirit refused witness to its holiness. Thus it was that he chose to offer his resignation as pastor of the Unitarian church in Boston, to which he had been called, rather than to continue to administer the "Sacrament of the Lord's Supper." He desired to do nothing to the value of which his conscience refused assent. This high moral judgment is rare in our generation; indeed, few natures in history have possessed it. "Father" Taylor, the distinguished Methodist preacher, said of Emerson that he was more like Jesus than any other man he ever knew. So he was more than a teacher—he was a beautiful example, being himself the truth which he taught.

It was a remarkable friendship with which he inspired Carlyle. The secret of it is that Carlyle, with all his errors of judgment, could yet recognize and appreciate sincerity, and Emerson was the most sincere of men. He held the truth which the Scot had sought so long and with such persistence and travail of spirit. He was a man, as Carlyle would have said, "not all clothes," but a moral Cromwell. Emerson's preternatural sagacity guided the wings which could soar into the highest cloudlands of speculation. It is customary to hear his "transcendentalism" spoken of—a term which is applied to those rapt utterances which are not readily cognizable by the understanding, but which are luminous to the spiritual eye of

the imagination. These Delphic outpourings are the most logical transcendentalism to be found anywhere. He puts a spiritual fact precisely as a mathematician submits a problem. He was one of the most clear-eyed of men, though some of his critics conceive him to have been at times excessively muddled in his vision. But through two different organs of sight do different men see and read all facts in Nature and humanity — one set of men through the material, the other through the spiritual eye. To the former order of intellect Emerson will always be more or less of a make-believe; to the latter, scarcely anything of him but will be comprehended. His dominant quality was his spirituality; and it is a marvelous thing that this spiritually exalted voice — the fittest survival of the idea of Anne Hutchinson, but the root of whose nature ran deep into the Puritan soil — should have arisen in our hasting, feverish, commercial life. It was a thrilling, earnest voice, to which many a young man is indebted for the first real inspiration to high and enduring motives. "Whatever I have done the world owes to him," says Professor Tyndall. In a copy of Emerson's "Nature," bought at a book-stall in London, he wrote, "Purchased by inspiration." Tyndall's reverence for Nature utters itself in almost the same accents as that immortal essay.

Let us consider how Emerson's intense spirituality influenced his estimate of the world's poets and teachers. He says of Landor: "He has a wonderful brain, despotic, violent, and inexhaustible, meant for a soldier." Of Wordsworth, whom he met in England, that "he made the impression of a narrow and very English mind; of one who paid for his rare elevation by general tameness and conformity." Of Swift, that "he described fictitious persons as if for the police." Of Hobbes, that "he was perfect in the noble, vulgar speech." Of Shakespeare, Spenser, and Milton as possessing "the national grip and exactitude of mind" and "treading the clouds securely as adamant." Of Coleridge's "vast attempts and inadequate performings." For Locke, Emerson had great disliking. The poetical mind will readily comprehend this, for the effort to reduce all things to matters of the understanding is at once destructive of the highest generalizations of the imaginative faculty. The hard, rationalistic philosophy, or rather mental method, of obtaining truth in observed facts, which Locke has fastened upon English thought, has availed much to the advantage of pure speculation. But the thesis that "all knowledge is the result of experience," by the success of which the doctrine of innate ideas, held by Plato and Descartes, and indeed by every great thinker since, seemed for a time overthrown, though it is reckoned Locke's greatest achievement, could yield no rich fruit of

imagination. Its value was that it corrected certain eccentricities of speculation. But, as Emerson expresses it, "Experience must follow and not lead the laws of the mind." The most unsatisfactory portion of Locke's celebrated Essay is that which is devoted to ideas. "The meaning of ideas was unknown to him," says Emerson. It was this gathering together of evidence with painful precision, this piling up of proofs, this method falsely called Baconian, this grub-worm philosophy, which inspired him with such righteous indignation. He felt the dearth of high insight, of broad generalization, in the speculative thought of Locke, Hume, and his more cotemporary thinkers. He felt that this philosophic materialism was destroying the finer fibre of English thought. There was no room for spiritual development where all spirit was ignored; where conscience was defined as "our own opinion of our own actions" (Locke); which left no place for a moral faculty in man; and where conduct was defined as "acts adjusted to ends, being good or bad as they are well or ill adjusted to ends" (Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics"). Emerson was a poet and a philosopher of the ideal. Besides this he was a man of high, spiritual feeling, and to him the materialistic tendency of the age, which had communicated itself to literature, was the denial of all beauty, of all imagination. It wanted the creative touch. Wordsworth alone seemed to have it. Scott was "a rhymed traveler's guide to Scotland"; Macaulay thought "the distinctive merit of the Baconian philosophy is its triumph over the old Platonic, its disentangling the intellect from the theories of the All-Fair and the All-Good and pruning it down to make a better wine-whey for an invalid; this not ironically, but in good faith; that solid advantage, as he calls it — meaning always sensual benefit — is the only good"; Dickens, "with all his preternatural apprehension of the language, the manners, and the varieties of street-life, with pathos and laughter, with patriotic and still enlarging generosity, writes London tracts"; Tennyson "climbs no mount of vision to bring the secrets to the people." To Emerson the best of all this literature was critical rather than creative. He gathered nothing from it save the picture of a decaying imagination, a false precision, a slow sapping at the very foundations of the Beautiful and the Ideal.

We see now the link which bound him in such close consanguinity to Carlyle. Unlike in superficies, they were allied by strong spiritual ties. Their complaints were almost identical, but Emerson's faith was larger. He saw "a retrieving power in the English race which made any recoil possible." And one other likeness there is between Carlyle and Emerson; *i. e.*, that their spirituality, or

so-called transcendentalism, was reducible to a practical formula, if not to common experience.

Now comes the question, was Emerson right in these judgments? The answer will be rendered according to one's intellectual temperament. But it is still true that no imagination of the first order has appeared in English literature during this century, if we except Wordsworth, and possibly Scott. Byron's was a destructive, not a creative imagination, and Coleridge was unhappily dwarfed by a feeble will. Macaulay does not indicate the high-water mark of historical writing; there is infinitely more imagination in Froissart and the old chroniclers. A line of Elizabethan verse outweighs all the poetry of our generation, if we except two or three of its greatest names. Donne, Herrick, Herbert, Shirley, with all their pedantry and labored artificialty, strike higher notes than Swinburne or Rossetti in all their range and scales. The latter have given us much of value, chiefly a marvelous music, to which it would seem our stubborn English accent could ill adapt itself; but for the true waters of inspiration we shall have to go to the deep well of the Elizabethan masters. Shakespeare, Emerson intuitively felt, lacked a high spirituality, and Goethe offended him because Goethe went about the world with pen and microscope and telescope, forever searching and inventing and theorizing and anatomizing. Goethe's luxurious life, too, seemed to Emerson an offence in his character. Yet in spite of these complaints he was forever returning to him, for his largeness and liberality, and for his close communion with Nature. Thus it was that the regal intellect of the great German filled a large part in Emerson's culture.

The theory of art which Emerson held, and which he at all times insisted upon, was that "Soul is form, and doth the body make." This inspired phrase of Spenser's, which embodies whole tomes of the philosophy of art, is not the modern conception of the nature of art. Nor does modern art-criticism, which is strikingly materialistic, take cognizance of any such truth. Notable among art-critics, as an example of this tendency, is M. Taine, who never touches the *soul* of the thing. He dissects with wonderful analytic skill, but it is purely a material diagnosis. When we say that Taine is incapable of realizing all spiritual aspiration, we have exhausted the enumeration of his defects as an art-critic, whether of painting or poetry. Emerson's was a poetical mind of a very high order, of intense spirituality, yet of much practical sagacity. He has given us touches of poetry which are not to be surpassed in the whole realm of literature, but they are no more than touches. Still they are admirable in poise — the mind of Emerson never trembled upon its throne.

Common sense and sagacity inform his most poetic flights. Emerson is always weighty, and his words on the tendency and direction of modern art deserve attention. He was for seeking the useful in the beautiful, for accepting the beautiful without question because it is useful. The modern tendency is to reject in the beautiful all that has not the appearance of usefulness. Emerson is one with Goethe and the Greeks. His theory was theirs also — Beauty for Beauty's sake. But with that rare judgment which distinguished him he perceived that its revival need not come in the same way nor in like forms as those of Greece. He did not believe modern life prosaic. He saw in the immense energy of its mill-wheels, its railroads, its steam-boats, its chemical wonders, its searching spirit, its bustling activity,—in fine, in its superlative vital movement,—the creation of epics which should rival the highest imagination of the ancient world. He would have smiled at Macaulay's dictum that "as civilization advances poetry necessarily declines." For he said: "It is the nature of poetry to spring like the rainbow, daughter of wonder, from the invisible, and to refuse all history." He would have answered Macaulay that Beauty cannot be destroyed, and that its elements are in the soul of man, not in his environment. Man makes his own heroic. No times are prosaic. Out of himself the strength shall come. The teachings of Emerson with reference to art constitute, therefore, a most valuable protest against the modern materialistic tendency. If in thus protesting he has been led to assume a tone which has been termed transcendental, it was but the natural recoil of a mind bruising itself against the bars which seemed to confine it. But quite as often it expresses only the inability of his critics to comprehend him. Emerson's literary judgments were determined by the value of the man. Mere perfection of literary workmanship did not recommend itself to him. He was quite as scornful as Carlyle of the thought which does not inspire to action, and more eager than Carlyle to welcome the bringer of a truth, come in what guise he might.

Emerson was a Seer, and a Seer is one who discerns the essence of all things to be God. This constitutes the reality of much of his prophecy. But Emerson's influence had limitations, and addresses itself not broadly, but to individuals. His majestic moral beauty, which led Father Taylor to consider him so like Jesus, irresistably brought to his feet the searching souls of young men drifting away from the religion of their fathers. He was their stay in the darkness when they were being hurried on to the broad sea of doubt and unrest — when they were passing through

what the Germans term the period of *gahrung*. It was the voice that answered them when they set up the cry of Jean Paul, "We are all orphans, you and I; we have no father," with the old-world answer, in a new language and a new meaning, "Search, and you shall find." But Emerson has stated his limitations with his own natural modesty: "I am not sufficiently master of the little truth I see to state it in forms so general as shall put every man in possession of my point of view."

What Emerson disliked above all things was *calculations;* and modern life in its social, intellectual, and religious character is supremely calculative. It does little through impulse; it is nothing if not critical; its eyes are bent on examination of forms in detail, and its purposes are the elaboration and curtailment of systems. Its philosophy is empirical. It walks not free. The old love of Nature, too, has disappeared from art, though it remains in a few individuals. The poetry of Wordsworth is its only survival in English literature. We have *calculated* it away. Emerson hid his eyes from all this machinery and detail, and stood face to face with his God in the bush,—in every bush and brake and rock and river and flower and shrub,—for to him all Nature was God.

And yet Emerson's critics object that his philosophy is without method! Those teachers whom he most revered were the least empirical; he hardly understood philosophy in its usual sense; it is doubtful whether he was even acquainted with the metaphysicians. He was not likely to value Kant and Hegel save as they approximate to a spiritual reality. Doubtless to him Kant's most impressive utterance was the saying so often quoted,—"Two things fill me with awe; the starry heavens, and the sense of responsibility in man,"—rather than all the discussion as to the *vernumft* and *verstand*. The poets, or the philosophers of the ideal, are the inspirers of purposes, not the organizers of methods. They are the winds behind the makers of ships and builders of mill-wheels that move affairs. It is idle then to tell us that Emerson's philosophy is not complete, as if forsooth he had designed a *novum organum*.

Emerson strove to free the intellect from the shackles of books and great names,—and here again we see a curious likeness to Carlyle. The latter regarded with fiery contempt those who looked upon the universe "through the helps and traditions of others," and he therefore adopted a faith which renders all past conquest of truth, all facts wrested from the close-fisted hand of Nature, all revelation, and the tuition of other men's experience, mere profitless chimeras. Do our fathers then transmit nothing?

Jesus and Paul teach anything? Vattel make international law clearer? Locke simplify the laws of the mind? Jomini, Napoleon, Frederick, teach anything of the arts of war? Newton of light? Darwin of Evolution? Mill of political economy? And must we not look at these things "through the helps and traditions" of these men? Carlyle was not respectful to great names. Leibnitz he speaks contemptuously of as "a wise-acre," but he admires the silly Frederick William, who declared Leibnitz, the friend of his mother, "a fool of a fellow." But Emerson never fell into this mistake. He had his likes and dislikes, which did not accord with the standard generally accepted, but he spoke of no intellect with contempt. This is what constitutes the intellectual beauty of Emerson, upon which we gaze as upon some perfect picture. His nature was the very essence of toleration. His mind was as tender as it was firm, and he struck at no one's fame. The fiery scorn of Carlyle was far enough from him. His sketch of the life of Ezra Ripley, in which he lingers almost affectionately over those quaint and foolish exaggerations of an intensely religious nature,—religious after the Hebraic caste,—is a beautiful example of Emerson's fine quality of impartial discernment. It is indicative, too, of that higher quality of *love*, which led the Greek poet to say, "I am human, therefore nothing human is foreign to me." Emerson held that it was not through the written word alone that men were to be informed. The soul should be an independent explorer. No one was ever freer from the shackles that bind the intellect. To all intents the elements of Nature were his own to arrange and group at will, and his mind over all was sovereign. Nothing had been settled for him; not even Plato shall decide a point against him. To be able thus to stand aloof, to take nothing upon hearsay, though it be uttered in immortal language, presupposes the rarest capacity. But it does not entail the refusal at at the same time to be assisted "through the helps and traditions of others." As Emerson would have said, we have departed the age of the poetry of illusion, and have come back to that of reality. Art, whereas it once had war, and patriotism, and the gods, now has peace, and science, and brotherhood, and steam. We have come to examine things closely; we throw them out from us no longer to survey them through the mists of phantasm. But this does not indicate the death of imagination, but only new conditions under which it may act.

A correct understanding of Emerson's poetry supposes a large knowledge of science. The scientific discoveries of the age passed through Emerson's mind, and came out spiritualized facts. There will always be a great difference

of opinion as to Emerson's position as a poet. The very form of his poetry is an unusual one. Though it does not follow the laws of metre it arranges itself naturally into musical expression. Let us persuade ourselves to accept it as it is. Do we ask if the rose sends out its perfume according to any grammar of arrangement? And is the fragrance of a verse to be tested by the measurement of its rhythmical feet?

Emerson was one of the most original forces in literature. There are, to be sure, suggestions here and there of Wordsworth, Goethe, and the Germans, but the elements are so mixed in him, transformed and reinformed, as to constitute a product as nearly original as can be discovered. Of course there can be no such thing as absolute originality, because all thought is suggestion, and is born of something else, with the likeness of its paternity. Absolute originality there is none, and cannot be. But Emerson's nature was so various as to enable him to seize readily upon all forms of truth and give them a new likeness and a new dialect.

Emerson has quickened the apprehension and directed the aspiration of many. But he has not dealt with humanity on general principles, but only with a few individuals who have sought a heroic ideal, who have asked for some rule, some example that shall guide them. He did not unriddle for them the universe — he did not attempt to explain all things to them; but he gave them the key which opens to many of Nature's secrets. He taught dependence on the faith of the soul; he bade them be careful how they place reliance on forms; he bade them above all be true. He would have no truce with any manner of falsehood, though it be whispered in love or thundered in anger. Let the immortal conscience speak; don't palter nor steal in act, or thought, or doctrine. Stand upright; don't crawl like a snake on your belly, nor get behind a scripture, nor cry out for Christ. Look the universe in the face. All things will solve themselves to the heroic man. Don't sneak away in a cave. Only to the ascetic are things dark. It is only when you begin to war with Nature that she punishes with blindness. To him who patiently sits at her feet she is the truest and gentlest of teachers. But you must not fly from her at the first threatenings of storm. This is the worst world possible for cowards and laggards.

These are stern teachings, and when uttered in words adequate, and supported by a real example, become potent for high influence. And this influence, which continues to unfold itself, is near and not remote. Emerson is no far star, but a presence.

Joseph Dana Miller.

GENERAL TOPICS.

THE OTHER SIDE.

"The other side" is always welcome to representation in our pages — limited only by the limits of space.

BOTH SIDES.

That The New Ideal, on the question of Social Reform, presents with force "both sides," must surely be recognized in the present issue, even as never before.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE-TRADE.

In the October number of this magazine there will be a "Reply," by an active Protectionist, to Mr. Holland's paper in the June number on "Wages and Tariffs"; while for the same issue (October), Mr. Holland has prepared a further paper, on his side of the question,—"Free-Trade and New South Wales."

JOTTINGS.

Modern thought of religion shows an ideal difficult of attainment. It cannot be had as a gift; it is not to be received in return for a form of words. It is offered only for merit.

If we can once get men and women to think, to reason, first giving them, as premises, the real facts of the world and a knowledge of the real forces of life, they will not be long in coming to conclusions in religion widely different from those commonly in vogue — and much more helpful.

When heat was applied to an ancient coin, on which the characters had become illegible, an inscription in honor of the gods came out. So may it be with the poor, cramped life of every man or woman living. Apply the heat of *larger opportunity*, of earnest endeavor, of imaginative soul, of search for truth, of loyalty to good,— then gloriously shall the inscription of *humanity* appear.

Strange that different men should see so differently, yet each deem himself the spokesman of the eternal forces! But all are needed. Each is a ray of the infinite light. And the infinite light has infinite hues and flashings. It is only when a man begins to think and act as if he were the sun itself, rather than a single ray, that we may begin to lose patience with him.

Mankind grows more and more into brotherhood as we find it coming down the centuries. Oceans and mountains

no more divide nations, nor ever shall again; nor do giant chasms of thought or mutual fear longer divide men. Sometime, religious fear also shall entirely vanish. Only religious awe and love, and practical, helpful thought shall have place or being. Men shall be brothers, and shall have one religion, a helpful faith,—founded on the real nature of things, working with universal forces, looking ever to human betterment, believing in the Eternal Now.

IS IT ALL BIAS, THEN?

An exchange prints on opposite pages, as items of news, but with no manifest recognition of the mutual interest of the paragraphs, the two sections which follow:

"Talk about questions of the day," said Mr. Gladstone, in a recent interview, "there is but one question, and that is the gospel. It can and will correct everything needing correction. All men at the head of great movements are Christian men. During the many years I was in the Cabinet, I was brought into association with sixty master-minds, and all but five of them were Christians. My only hope for the world is in bringing the human mind into contact with divine revelation."

Prof. Drummond, in a recent talk to the students of the Melbourne University, after telling of his admiration for and indebtedness to Ruskin, Emerson, George Eliot, Channing, and F. W. Robertson, remarked that one day, as he was looking over his mantel-shelf library, it suddenly struck him that all these authors were heretics; that these were dangerous books. Undesignedly, he had found stimulus and help from teachers who were not credited with Orthodoxy. And he had since found that much of the good to be got from books was to be gained from authors often classed as dangerous, for these provoked inquiry and exercised one's own powers.

FREETHOUGHT AND THE WORLD'S ADVANCE.

A bit of correspondence which the *Christian Register* surprises us by admitting to its columns in a recent issue will go aptly with the foregoing. It is headed "Cremation," and we reprint it both for the value of its subject-matter and for its incidental candid justice to Freethought:

In talking with a bright English lady visiting Boston, I asked her how the subject was regarded in England. She replied with evident horror that cremation was earnestly supported by many of the first physicians and surgeons of London, but that the Church would never regard it as anything less than sacrilege to "the temple of the Holy Ghost." The body should be treated reverently, she said; nor could I persuade her that the solemn consigning of the body, after such religious services as might be desired, to the pure, rapid dissolution by heat was treatment far more reverent than that now so common, of allowing slow and abhorrent decay, attended by grave dangers to the living, to bring about the same result. She closed the conversation by saying, "I fear the advancement of cremation must be left to the 'Freethinkers.'" I could not repress the thought that to the "Free-

thinkers" of all ages the world owes most of the advancement of to-day. . . .

If the earnest men and women in the Unitarian body would investigate cremation, making a written statement of their will in the matter, and using their influence to educate their friends to a clearer conception of the importance and beauty of this manner of disposing of the body, the generation to follow us would have yet more cause to be grateful to the "Freethinkers."

ON POVERTY.

THESE recent words of Mr. Wm. J. Potter, on "Poverty," will well bear re-printing:

There may be, and often is, a poverty that is not degrading, that does not eat into the substance of the mind or the soul, that furnishes resistance rather, on which personal energy and character are developed. Such was the poverty met and conquered by our Pilgrim ancestors on the bleak New England shore in the seventeenth century. Similar conditions of poverty are often individually overcome to-day.

But when, as in this land to-day, and in the countries of Europe, poverty with its crushing burdens has become a wide-spread, compact, corrupting mass in the midst of surrounding prosperity and plenty, so that we have to speak of *classes* of the suffering poor in contradistinction from the wealthy and prosperous, and this in an era of civilization abounding in luxury, culture, and refinement—here is sure indication of something wrong in the economic condition of the body politic; indication not merely of a necessary hardness of lot to be endured for a time in the soldierly spirit and from which robustness of character will come, but indication of a seated social disease which calls for a remedy.

And it is the special significance of the present agitation of the social problem that so large a number of persons have come to regard the problem from this point of view—that so many have become convinced that the present social trouble is not simply a temporary accident to be bravely borne for principle's sake, much less the normal and permanent condition of society, but an abnormal and diseased state of the social system, for which there should be wisdom and philanthropy enough in the human race at this day to find a cure. It is an immense gain to have got thus far.

SUPPOSE.

ONE of the editors of the Christian Socialist monthly in New York city, *For the Right*, says "Suppose." But of course every clear-sighted political economist could easily and would undoubtedly laugh this poor editor to scorn. The "supposition" is "impossible." And moreover, "It wouldn't be six months before everything would be back just where it was before."

Suppose a county in England [why not in America?] in which there are about 200 families, and a total amount of wealth estimated at something over $1,000,000. There are two wealthy men, one a land-owner, the other a manufacturer; each is worth nearly $500,000. The rest of the people are tenant farmers, farm laborers, and factory hands, and their property ranges from a suit of clothes up to $1000.

Suppose another county of equal size, with the same number of people, and the same total amount of wealth, but in which the

wealth is divided with tolerable equality. Suppose the rural population owned its own land, and the factory were a co-operative concern, and that every family had a right to property worth from $1000 to $10,000.

Query.— 1. In which of the two would be the largest total amount of happiness? 2. In which would the grog-shops thrive best? 3. In which would it be easiest for young people to marry and keep out of bad ways? 4. In which would most money be available for education and public improvements? 5. In which would it be easiest to live a religious and intellectual life, if a man wanted to?

"A LIBERAL EDUCATION."

In the current reawakening of the discussion as to what constitutes "a liberal education," we may recall the notable word of Mr. Huxley. If any college Dean can paint *a Man* with rounder skill, The New Ideal will gladly print his word. Says Huxley:

"That man, I think, has had a liberal education who has been so trained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will, and does with ease and pleasure all the work which, as a mechanism, it is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold logic-engine with all its parts of equal strength and in smooth working-order,— ready like a steam-engine to be turned to any kind of work, and spin the gossamers as well as forge the anchors of the mind; whose brain is stored with a knowledge of the great and fundamental truths of Nature and the laws of her operation; one, who, no stunted ascetic, is full of life and fire, but whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience; who has learned to love all beauty, whether of Nature or of art, to hate all vileness, and to respect others as himself. Such a one, and no other, I conceive, has had a liberal education, for he is, as completely as a man can be, in harmony with Nature. He will make the best of her, and she of him. They will get on together rarely,— she as his ever beneficent mother; he as her mouthpiece, her conscious self, her minister and interpreter."

A NOVEL CHURCH AND PASTOR.

We are always somewhat mystified, though perhaps (such is the trend of the times) never greatly surprised, when the fresh name and address of an Orthodox Congregational minister is added to the continuously growing list of such on the subscription-books of The New Ideal. We were therefore duly mystified if not surprised when, in 1889, the subscription of Rev. Judson Titsworth of Milwaukee was received. After meeting with the following, however, just going the rounds of the press,— and which therefore seems to be public property,— the mystery

as well as the surprise ceases. The paragraphs will bring light and a glow of warmth to many,—and it is forever light and warmth of which it is the mission of mankind's "new ideal" to be the harbinger:

There is in Milwaukee a church which resembles a club-house. It is called the Plymouth Congregational church, the Rev. Judson Titsworth being its pastor. Mr. Titsworth is an earnest advocate of what he calls "religious reason." His church has a large membership, and is said to be one of the most prosperous and influential in the city. It is described as having no steeple; its auditorium, in its novel arrangement, resembles that of a theatre, having a balcony and boxes at the sides. There are parlors, elegantly fitted up, which are used for devotional purposes; a room where theatrical performances are given; bath-rooms; a gymnasium; a large reading-room, and play-rooms for children. There is, in fact, very little about the building in its appointments, its style or architecture, that suggests a church. In many of its features it resembles a perfected Young Men's Christian Association; but it is a church, for all that, and is so called by the pastor and his devout congregation. This Rev. Mr. Titsworth is a man of ideas, notwithstanding he is likely to be placed on the list of cranks. And he is on the right line. He says that religion in itself is beautiful, while the solemnity with which it is often surrounded is oppressive. He believes in a cheerful religion; in sunlight and song, and the natural and pleasing adornment of the places where God is worshiped. True, useful religion, he says, is all sunshine, and this is the religion which he preaches from his pulpit.

Mr. Titsworth's church must be a curiosity. It is never closed or silent. In the week, when their school-tasks are ended, the children flock to it and romp on their play-ground, while their merry voices ring like music through its walls and reach the outside world. While athletes are stretching their limbs in the gymnasium, and children are playing at games near by, prayers and religious services are heard in the parlors appointed for the purpose, and a wave of humanity streams in and out of the church's doors continually.

It may surprise the strictly orthodox and conventional among Christians to hear that this man, with his novel ideas and eccentricities, is doing good work for the cause of religion, and is one of the most successful laborers in the religious field; that the children love him and flock to him in thousands, and the people rise up and call him blessed. If, as he says, he is "fighting the devil with his own weapons," he is not only making a strong fight, but the prospects of victory are largely on his side.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ON PHYSICAL LAWS.

I HAVE been interested to read what has recently been published in THE NEW IDEAL on "Law, Physical and Moral." I take it to be a good sign that the philosophers begin to wrestle with the terms of physical science, and I wish a greater number could be interested in their significance. But what I wish to do here is to point out the inadequacy of Mr. Salter's definition of the law of gravitation.

Mr. Salter says: "The law of gravitation is . . . simply a sum-

mary and abstract statement of an actual tendency of material bodies"; and Dr. Janes quotes it, adding, "Very true." Now, as I understand it, the law of gravitation is a *mathematical relation* existing between two bodies in space, not a *tendency* at all. Gravitation and the law of gravitation are very different things, and I suspect that Mr. Salter had the former in mind when he wrote the above definition, though it was the *law* which he proposed to define. The law is, that the force of gravitation between two bodies may be expressed by the product of their masses divided by the square of the distance between them, and is generally written $f = \frac{mm'}{d^2}$. This relation holds throughout the visible universe. As it involves distance it states a geometrical truth.

When it is stated that the sum of the angles of a plane triangle equals 180°, there is not implied anything in the nature of a tendency. It is a mathematical relation and in the nature of things cannot be different. As knowledge of phenomena and their relations become more exact it is found possible to state them in a mathematical way, and thus *laws* are discovered. A physical law may be said to be a precise statement of physical relations, true always and everywhere and capable of being expressed mathematically.

There is another point connected with this controversy that needs a little more emphasis, namely: In physics there are no contingent laws. The law of gravitation, for instance, is not conditional. It is independent of time or place, nearness or remoteness; there is no condition or other law that ever modifies it in the slightest degree; it is never interfered with or opposed or nullified; is never in conflict with any other law or condition. It cannot properly be said to operate, to oppose, to act, or to do anything whatever. And the same may be said of other physical laws. Perhaps if this be kept in mind there will be less reliance upon "laws" accomplishing anything.

A. E. Dolbear.

BOOK NOTES.

Theodore Parker. A Lecture. By Samuel Johnson. Edited by John H. Clifford and Horace L. Traubel. Pages, 78; cloth, $1.00. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., Publishers.

"Here is the estimate of Theodore Parker," says Mr. Clifford in the Preface, "left by a fellow-worker in religion and life qualified to speak of that still unmeasured Prophet of the soul and of social reformation for whom remains increasing reverence as both gift and guide of America's noblest spirit and permanence among the great teachers and friends of man." These are strong words—but none too strong. The whole lecture is an inspiration, and the twenty-two years during which (according to the Note) the essay slowly took shape and being in Mr. Johnson's mind left it at the last clear and keen and beautiful. No student of Parker will be without this book. It cannot add to our reverence, but it will add to our knowledge and insight, and we get new and startling consciousness of how this mighty Boanerges against religious and social wrong was still also the meek John of love and tears.

The Rag-Picker of Paris. By Felix Pyat. Translated from the French by Benj. R. Tucker. Pages, 317, with portrait of the author; cloth, $1.00, paper, 50 cents. Boston: Benj. R. Tucker, Publisher.

With the title and the author's name gone, given any ten pages of this novel and it would at once be recognized as the great work of some French master of his art. It is dramatic and bloody all through—its rapidly following incidents are murders, duels, suicides, robbery, love, lust. Yet it portrays also devotion, tenderness, forgiveness. There is little in it, outwardly, of serenity.

In everything it is radical and audacious. In its suggestions of a new order of society, in matters of religion and marriage and medicine and law, it is a stirring drama of the seething thought of the present day and hour in a city of wealth and poverty, of careless power and restless servitude. Yet in all it gives not one encouragement to vice or evil or any immorality. It is destructive, but only that it may be constructive. It despises hypocrisy that it may love truth. It pictures terrible pictures, but of undoubted fact, and with the purpose alone of leading on. It is terrible, but in the "saving" of the world it will play its great part. In noble object it can be compared only to *Les Miserables*, and in some ways (as even Victor Hugo himself has declared) it is that marvelous work's superior. Into Time's fateful basket the iron hook of Pyat's progressive pen will indeed help to toss as rags every tawdry and shameful thing of to-day, in church or State or home. "Into the basket! Into the basket!"

Studies in Psychic Science. By Hudson Tuttle. Pages, 250. New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co., Publishers.

To the simply curious in psychic phenomena every page of this book will be highly "interesting." To those who know little of the *philosophy* of modern "Spiritualism" it will be an introductory and explanatory treatise of great value. To the professed Spiritualist of the spiritual rather than material mind it will be a convenient and helpful hand-book of his thought and belief. For all it will have a widening and calming influence. It is simple in language and serene in spirit. The closing chapter especially—even if not, as the author "knows" it to be, a record of fact—is at least a dream of blessedness, than which, for the To Be, we could ask nothing higher.

BOOKS RECEIVED—FOR LATER NOTICE.

[From the Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago.]

The Ethical Problem. Three lectures before the Society for Ethical Culture, Chicago. 1. Ethics a Science; 2. The Data of Ethics; 3. The Theories of Ethics. Pages, 90; cloth, 50 cents.

Three Lectures on the Science of Language and its Place in General Education. By F. Max Mueller. Pages, 112; cloth, 75 cents.

Wheelbarrow. Articles and Discussions on the Labor Question. With autobiography and portrait of the author (Gen. M. M. Trumbull). Pages, 303; cloth, $1.00.

Epitomes of Three Sciences: Comparative Philology (H. Oldenburg), Psychology (J. Jastrow), and Old Testament History (C. H. Cornill). Pages, 139; cloth, 75 cents.

[From H. L. Green, Buffalo, N. Y.]

The Gods. By Robert G. Ingersoll. Paper, 40 pages; 20 cents.

What would follow on the Effacement of Christianity? By George Jacob Holyoake. Paper, 15 pages; 10 cents.

[From the American News Co., New York.]

Viera; a Romance 'twixt the Real and Ideal. By Roman I. Zubof. New edition, with life and portrait of the author. Paper, 341 pages; 50 cents.

[From the Lovell Company, New York.]

The Pathway of the Spirit,—Christian Theosophy series, No. 2. By J. H. Dewey, M.D. Pages, 320; cloth, $1.25, paper, 75 cents.

One Life, One Law. By Mrs. Myron Reed. Cloth, 223 pages.

[From the American Public Health Association, Rochester, N. Y.]

Practical Sanitary and Economic Cooking, adapted to Persons of Moderate and Small Means. The Lombard Prize Essay. By Mrs. Mary Hinman Abel. Cloth, 190 pages; 40 cents.

[For sale by Estes & Lauriat, Boston.]

Aryan Sun-Myths the Origin of Religions. By Sarah E. Titcomb, author of "Early New England People," etc. With an Introduction by Charles Morris, author of "The Aryan Race," etc. Cloth, 192 pages.

[From S. C. W. Byington & Co., New York.]

Human Life; or, The Course of Time. By Caleb S. Weeks. Cloth (verse), 359 pages; $1.25.

[From John B. Alden, New York.]

Lord Ively. An Epic Poem in XIV Books. By John Haddaeus. Cloth, 162 pages.

[From the Truth-Seeker Company, New York.]

Freethought: Is it Destructive or Constructive? A Symposium by Col. Ingersoll, Capt. R. C. Adams, H. O. Pentecost, F. M. Holland, and sixteen other notable Freethought writers. Paper, 82 pages; 25 cents.